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Ethics and Nanotechnology:  
The Issue of Perfectionism 
Catherine Larrère 
Abstract: This paper aims at investigating perfectionism, as the project, shared 
by biotechnologies and nanotechnologies, of human enhancement. This pro-
ject is commonly criticized (by Jean-Pierre Dupuy or Michael Sandel) as rep-
resenting a kind of hyper-agency, a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, 
including human nature, to serve our purposes, and satisfy our desires. It 
should thus be addressed as a metaphysical or even theological problem. We 
would like to argue that this project is not so much Promethean as it is Pela-
gian. It does not aim so much at being as powerful as God, than at achieving 
individual, personal felicity, the way Pelagus argued that all men could achieve 
their own perfection. We argue that the claim of perfectionism is first an ethi-
cal one, since it pertains to what Sidgwick called ‘egoist hedonism’. We then 
question this claim from a social point of view: What kind of social relation-
ships is implied by the quest for individual perfectionism. This is an ethical as 
well as an epistemological question. 
Keywords: nanotechnology, biotechnology, ethics, theology, perfectionism. 
1. Introduction 
In 2003, the French Ministry of Research and New Technologies wrote in a 
leaflet about nanotechnology’s ‘societal issues’: “the prospect of manipulat-
ing matter at the molecular scale and of interfering with the world of the liv-
ing obviously addresses ethical issues” (quoted by Dupuy 2004, p. 2, my em-
phasis). Is it that obvious? The leaflet does not tell, but many works have 
answered that question. Technologies’ ethical evaluation usually follows two 
leads: safety and justice. On the one hand, emerging technologies are evalu-
ated according to their sanitary, food, and environmental risks, which often 
leads to a cost-benefits analysis of the expected consequences. On the other 
hand, there is the question if these new technologies could affect the funda-
mental liberties (freedom, equality, autonomy).
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  Let us suppose that nanotechnology passes these two types of evaluation, 
that it can be proved safe, that it does not undermine justice – the fundamen-
tal liberties are not threatened and this technology is accessible to all: Could 20 Catherine  Larrère 
 
we then argue that nanotechnology has successfully passed its moral test, and 
that any further ethical investigation would come close to technophobia? 
Some philosophers do not think so. Jean-Pierre Dupuy thus drastically ques-
tions the moral relevance of risk evaluation. Indeed, it deals only with the 
consequences and does not morally question nanotechnology’s project in 
itself. Following Popper and Meyerson, Dupuy means to spot what he calls 
nanotechnology’s ‘metaphysical research program’, a set of non-testable 
views that are not amenable to falsification, and that both inspire and limit 
the questions raised (Dupuy 2004, p. 8). Dupuy argues that this framework is 
embedded in the NBIC program, especially in its cognitivist aspect, and sees 
it both as the fading of the subject in its classic concept – in relation to the 
program of naturalization of the mind – as well as the assertion of its all-
might.  
 In  The Case against Perfectionism, Michael J. Sandel examines the ‘ethics 
of enhancement’ which he characterizes as perfectionism (Sandel 2007). He 
deals with the common aim of genetic engineering (genetic manipulations, 
cloning) and nanotechnology to improve human performances beyond all 
usually admitted limits, even to the point of imagining the end of mortality. 
He questions the idea – held up by Habermas (2003) – that the pursuit of 
such an enhancement would violate the liberal principles of liberty and 
autonomy (Sandel 2007, p. 80). That is why he does not dwell on the ethical 
objection that such an ambition would turn Man into Machine, or would see 
Man only as Machine – which would come down to question his autonomy 
(Grunwald & Julliard 2007). “The problem is not the drift to mechanism but 
the drive to mastery.” (Sandel 2007, p. 27) The issue therefore is not the 
threats on autonomy, but, on the contrary, it is the power of humans, their 
ability to artificialize the world (and themselves) without any limit, to iden-
tify their will and power with that of God. 
  Whereas ordinary evaluation of technologies places the ethical problems 
in the political and social fields (safety, rights, liberties, justice), Dupuy as 
well as Sandel consider that the discussion has shifted to issues that are gen-
erally considered metaphysical (Dupuy) or theological (Sandel) rather than 
political or moral philosophy.  
  Is this diagnosis justified? Does perfectionism, aimed at by nanotechnol-
ogy and biotechnology and championed by transhumanists, question our re-
lation to nature and to God more than it questions our political and social 
conditions of existence? To answer this question, it is necessary to specify 
the kind of perfectionism. First I will rely on John Passmore’s historical sur-
vey of the idea of perfection or perfectibility of Man in order to describe the 
specific perfectionism related to the converging technologies program. This 
will lead me to argue that this desire for control should be called ‘Pelagian’ 
rather than ‘Promethean’. The difference, as I will subsequently show, lies in   Ethics and Nanotechnology: The Issue of Perfectionism  21 
the kind of ethical question dealt with: the ‘Promethean’ ambition is based 
upon the problem of power, which we might call theological, whereas the 
Pelagian ambition unveils the power of individual self-assertion, what Henry 
Sidgwick calls ‘egoistic hedonism’. This, as I will finally try to show, will lead 
us again to political and social problems. 
2. Did you say perfectionism? Which perfectionism?  
Greek philosophy is fond of order and temperance. It therefore condemned 
Man’s attempts in overstepping human limits and equaling God, calling it 
hubris (excessive pride). It is commonly admitted (Jaeger 1946, p. 33f.) that 
Greek philosophy discouraged Man to imitate the gods who, by the way, 
were not that admirable according to the ancients. John Passmore did not 
deny this, spotting it in the tragedies and underlining Pindarus’ quotation: 
“Mortal things suit mortals best.” (Pindarus, Isthmian Odes, V, lines 14-16) 
However, he showed that Greek philosophy cannot be reduced to a condem-
nation of hubris. Heir to a strongly religious tradition – through Orphism, 
Parmenides, and Pythagoras – from Plato to Plotinus and Aristotle, Greek 
philosophy suggested Man to become like gods by means of contemplation, 
which gave Man the opportunity to identify with the Being. In its beginning, 
the Christian doctrine proceeded from an assimilation of Hebraic thought 
and Greek Philosophy. Nonetheless the founding fathers of the orthodox, 
classical Christian doctrine rejected perfectionism Man could not possibly be 
perfect: the original sin – once its doctrine was shaped by Augustine – makes 
Man unfit for perfection. Besides, perfection as it was conceived by the 
Greeks could only be reached by a few, and that does not match Christian-
ity’s egalitarian tendency. So the aim of perfection remained only in marginal 
or doomed currents, as is the case with Pelagius, an English lay-monk of the 
fifth century, whose heresy Augustine condemned. 
  Renaissance humanism and its continuation in the philosophy of Enlight-
enment renewed the context of the thought of perfection. It became secular: 
salvation or eternal life were no longer at issue, it was rather about improve-
ment of Man’s earthly living conditions, about happiness. There was a shift 
from perfection to perfectibility. Greek or Christian conceptions insisted on 
a brutal conversion that would tear Man away from his human imperfection 
and plunge him into the fullness of being, whereas secular conceptions in-
sisted on the path’s progressiveness, on gradual improvement without estab-
lished limits, to be attained by all humans equally – which was very different 
from the former conceptions of perfection that limited it to a small number. 
That was the beginning of the stress on education (Locke) in the process of 22 Catherine  Larrère 
 
perfectibility – as opposed to conversion leading to perfection, which could 
take place at any time in life.  
  Here, several conceptions of perfection come into play. John Passmore 
arranges them between two opposite poles. On the one hand, there is a 
purely technical conception of perfection, defined as the successful achieve-
ment of a given task; perfection here has to do with performance. On the 
other hand, there is a metaphysical conception that considers perfection a 
door to a higher reality, or the ability to identify with an ideal. The interme-
diate conceptions make either metaphysical perfection more reachable or the 
definition of the technical perfection broader. An example is the Aristotelian 
conception of perfection as the fulfillment of one’s nature (or the realization 
of one’s potentialities), as the achievement of a purpose. This teleological 
conception can be combined with an aesthetic conception of perfection, an 
ordered system in which all parts harmoniously contribute to the unity of the 
whole. The technical conception of perfection can also be extended by con-
sidering that being a human is achieving one’s task at any moment in life, 
thus attaining a ‘good life’. “Perfection, then, is not metaphysical perfection, 
but task perfection, and man’s task is a moral one” (Passmore 1970 p. 152). 
But this moral extension of the technical definition of perfection (the per-
formance in the achievement of a task) preserves its original feature: Not 
only moral education can enhance Man, also the changes in his physical envi-
ronment and the material intervention on him can do so. Passmore recog-
nized in the behaviorism of his time the extension of this conception of per-
fection, both technical and moral. According to him, this doctrine was widely 
accepted in the United States and the USSR by the end of the 1960’s, 
“countries which are deeply involved in the technical management of human 
beings and both committed to the belief that ‘all men are equal’” (Passmore, 
1970, p. 256). 
  The perfectionism of bionanotechnology – i.e. human enhancement – 
pertains to the same technical management of Man, with a moral calling. It is 
indeed obvious that the human enhancement promised by the NBIC conver-
gence has not much to do with the conception of a metaphysical perfection 
that would be achieved through contemplation or mystical rapture, and that 
would open the door to a higher reality. It does concern, however, the belief 
in the infinite perfectibility of human nature, risen and asserted in Europe 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Transhumanists like Nick 
Bostrom (who defines himself as Condorcet’s follower) claim to be represen-
tatives of that lineage.
2 One could say, however, that by pretending to be able 
to override even death, transhumanists are taking up the metaphysical or reli-
gious idea of becoming ‘God’s equal’. But, as Louis Dumont showed, that is 
modernity’s ambition, expressed by Bacon or Descartes:    Ethics and Nanotechnology: The Issue of Perfectionism  23 
What is of paramount importance is that we have here the model of modern 
artificialism at large, the systematic application to the things of this world of 
an extrinsic, imposed value. Not a value derived from our belonging in this 
world, such as harmony or our harmony with it, but a value rooted in our het-
erogeneity in relation to it: the identification of our will with the will of God 
(Descartes’ man will make himself “master and possessor of nature”). The will 
applied to the world, the end sought after, the motive and inner spring of the 
will are extraneous; they are, to say the same thing, essentially outworldly. 
Outwordliness is now concentrated in the individual’s will. [Dumont 1986, p. 
56] 
Such an ‘extra-worldliness’ of the will, equaling Man with God, can only be 
understood by referring to Pelagius. According to Passmore, Pelagius’ ideas, 
beyond the religious conflict between grace and liberty, still pervade the 
secularized context of modernity. To him, Pico della Mirandola, champion of 
Renaissance humanism, glorified the human will’s potentialities to a level un-
equaled since Pelagius. To Pico della Mirandola, indeed, God created Man as 
a creature of undetermined nature. He can chose the place he will occupy in 
universe, because he was born devoid of any nature, but with the ability to 
decide upon the nature he will take up. This idea of a man whose nature is 
not to have any, and who can therefore rely entirely on his will, would al-
ready have existed in Pelagius. According to the latter, we were born with the 
ability to perfect (as well as to pervert) ourselves through free will. This 
comes down to denying the idea of the original sin, thus exposing Pelagius to 
be considered heretic. But it also makes him a necessary example for Des-
cartes’ and even more Bacon’s artificializing and transforming ambitions. In-
deed, according to Passmore, in order to reconcile Christianity with the 
technical optimism Bacon champions, one has to rely on Pelagius. Making all 
technical enhancements available to Man, saving him from disease and even 
from death, comes down to reinstating Man’s influence on Nature before the 
Fall. Therefore it comes down to assuming that the original sin is not irre-
versible in this life, that Man, by leaving Eden, was not sentenced to suffering 
once and for all.
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  Prometheus is nowhere to be found in this matter of perfection and per-
fectibility. It seems to me that the perfectionism aimed at by NBIC human 
enhancement should therefore be defined as Pelagian rather than Promethean 
(Promethean being the term most often used).
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3. From Prometheus to Pelagius: from serving mankind 
to glorifying man 
Prometheus stole fire from the gods to give it to man whom he considered 
resourceless and fragile. His motivation was altruistic – it even led him to 
sacrifice himself. From this point of view, characterizing undertakings as 
‘Promethean’ is saying that they exceed ordinary human abilities, and rather 
pertain to divine action – as was said of cloning, which, like God, ‘creates’ 
human beings without submitting to lineage continuity. It is a question of 
power. Its ambition can certainly be questioned, or at least it can be sug-
gested that it might backfire on the one who carried it out, but its aim is seen 
as humanist (it serves humanity).  
  Pelagius in the fifth century (AD) affirmed the possibility for each man 
to achieve salvation through his own strength (Passmore, 1970, p. 139-140). 
The individual-oriented purpose of this pursuit of salvation is not ques-
tioned: any Christian will admit that one might aspire to salvation. It is even 
a duty. The secularization of this aspiration, shifting from salvation to happi-
ness, does preserve its legitimacy. And the Pelagian inheritance is to be found 
in the certainty that man is not naturally evil, he can thus achieve his happi-
ness without it being necessarily perverted or spoilt. The Pelagian perfection-
ism – as a technical pursuit of a perfection extended to the entire human life – 
can therefore be seen as a form of what Henry Sidgwick calls ‘psychological’ 
or ‘egoistic hedonism’. This is understood, according to him, “as implying 
the adoption of his own happiness as the ultimate end of each individual’s 
actions” (Sidgwick 1874, p. 185). Nothing excessive about that: “Generally, 
in the ages of Christian faith, it has been obvious and natural to hold that the 
realisation of virtue is essentially an enlightened and far-seeing pursuit of 
Happiness for the agent.” (Ibid., p. 186) 
  If the perfectionism that bio- and nanotechnologies are striving for is a 
form of ‘egoistic hedonism’, it is not surprising that a deontological evalua-
tion of nanotechnology has nothing to object. Why go against one of today’s 
strongest and most insistent deontological attitudes, i.e. the right to self-
affirmation, to create one’s own happiness? In what Sidgwick calls ‘psycho-
logical’ or ‘egoistic hedonism’, one can recognize the right of the subject’s 
particularity, his right to be satisfied, which Hegel considered as the origins 
of civil society. This right to a subjective particularity as an unconditional 
deontological principle, this sacred right of the individual subject, is the core 
of the libertarian conception, according to which the individual is the owner 
of his body, and can therefore do whatever he wants with it. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that many libertarian arguments support the ethics of human 
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  ‘Psychological hedonism’ is certainly not not the only ethical principle of 
modernity. Sidgwick argued that besides the idea that virtue consists in the 
enlightened pursuit of happiness, there were a number of authors – including 
Mandeville, for instance, and Kant, of course – to whom an action, in order 
to be virtuous, must be devoid of any motives or interests. But Sidgwick also 
considered that there is no rational arbitration between the different deonto-
logical principles. According to him, utilitarianism relies on an unsolved and 
rationally unsolvable dilemma between ‘universalist hedonism’ (that of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, leading to self-sacrifice for the 
sake of the whole) and ‘egoistic hedonism’ that leads to pursue one’s own 
happiness above all. To Sidgwick, in this conflict, ‘egoistic hedonism’ has the 
advantage of being considered more reasonable by common sense, so that 
“the onus probandi lies with those who maintain that disinterested conduct, 
as such, is reasonable” (ibid., p. 186).  
  A frequent objection to transhumanists is to refer to human dignity, as 
Habermas (2003) did. But transhumanists urge those who criticize them to 
point out their arguments, themselves only reaffirming their principles, bank-
ing on the impossibility to tell someone ‘I don’t want you to be happy, 
healthy, I don’t want you to live as long as possible, etc.’ Who would tell 
anyone – without being paternalistic – that he knows better than him what 
his happiness consists in? (Bostrom 2008) Hence transhumanism constantly 
reaffirms the modern idea that virtue consists in the enlightened pursuit of 
happiness. 
  If perfectionism is indeed about one of the ethical principles of modernity 
and shows its moral plurality, if it cannot therefore be overcome or replaced 
by other ethical principles, would it not be better to focus rather on the posi-
tion of Man in the world and his relationships with nature? It could be ar-
gued, then, that the issue is becoming a religious one. It depends of what we 
mean by ‘religious’. 
4. Religion or politics?  
Michael Sandel rejects the objection according to which his position of ac-
cepting what is ‘given’ is a religious one: he claims that it does not at all imply 
a belief in a personal God (Sandel 2007, p. 85). But the definition of a reli-
gious position might not be reducible to the belief in a personal God. In a 
book about the relationships between science and religion, Mary Midgley 
rightly points out that  
A faith is not primarily a factual belief, the acceptance of a few extra proposi-
tions like ‘God exists’ or ‘there will be a revolution’. It is rather the sense of 26 Catherine  Larrère 
 
having one’s place within a whole greater than oneself, one whose larger aims 
so enclose one’s own and give them point that sacrifice for it may be entirely 
proper. [Migdley 2002, p. 16]  
The relation to the ‘given’, which perfectionism would cancel out and which 
Sandel asks us to take into account, might deal with such a ‘belief’ in our be-
longing to a wider whole that we might call nature. The ethics of “reverence” 
that Sandel opposes to the ethics of “mastery” (Sandel 2007, p. 85), which is 
where perfectionism falls into, is similar to environmental ethics of respect of 
nature and its intrinsic values (see, for instance, Taylor 1986). Should these 
kinds of ethics be seen as religious ones – which is the objection environ-
mental ethics often has to face? Such a ‘belief’, Midgley specifies in a chapter 
on environmental ethics, is shared by all scientists in a basic form, and does 
not have to be considered religious.  
Many scientists who are card-carrying atheists can still see the point of pre-
serving the biosphere. So can the rest of us, religious or otherwise. It is the 
whole of which we are parts, and its other parts concern us for that reason. 
[Midgley 2002, p. 185]  
To the people who think that such a statement is religious if it backs moral 
propositions she returns the objection. Those who would claim to be repre-
sentative only of man would be no less religious:  
Anyone wishing above all to avoid the religious dimension should consider 
that the intense individualism which has focused our attention exclusively on 
the social-contract model is itself thoroughly mystical. It has glorified the in-
dividual human soul as an object having infinite and transcendent value, has 
hailed it as the only real creator, and has bestowed on it much of the panoply 
of God. [Ibid., pp. 189-190] 
We are therefore facing a dual ethical trend of reverence and mastery. We 
could only escape the religious sphere by discovering what they both have in 
common: the focuses on individual and on man-nature relationships both 
neglect social relationships.  
  Sandel states that we should not try to completely nullify the ‘genetic lot-
tery’, because there is a positive relationship between contingency and free-
dom. We see ourselves all the more as actors of our own decisions as there is 
some sort of chance in our birth, a ‘given’ that was not the result of human 
mastery. By doing so, he is taking an interest in the philosophical dimension 
of freedom as Montesquieu defined it: “Philosophical liberty consists in the 
exercise of one’s will or, at least (if all systems must be mentioned), in one’s 
opinion that one exerts one’s will.” (Montesquieu 1973, p. 202) But Montes-
quieu added that “Political liberty consists in security or, at least, in the opin-
ion one has of one’s security” (ibid.). The symmetry between the two defini-
tions should not be mistaken for equivalence. Philosophical freedom is an   Ethics and Nanotechnology: The Issue of Perfectionism  27 
introspective relationship, whereas political freedom is the relation of an in-
dividual to other individuals. Indeed, safety implies that “the government 
must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen.” (Ibid., p. 169) 
This comes down to assuming that the philosophical definition – whether it 
is metaphysical or theological – alone cannot define freedom, and that appre-
ciating political freedom (in society) implies knowledge of human relation-
ships.  
  Yet perfectionism and its underlying conception of the individual do not 
take into account these relationships. Sandel states that the self-generation 
aimed at by perfectionism comes down to “changing our nature to fit the 
world” (Sandel 2007, p. 97). This world is not the external nature we should 
respect for its being ‘given’. It is the world we have created and turned into 
nature: the world of economy. Perfectionism focuses on performance and 
appears to be an attempt to fit a competitive world, with the entailed spiraling 
out of control – uncontrolled competition and unlimited growth. Hence the 
reference to athletes, sports being a model of pure competition in an unlim-
ited pursuit of enhancement. A performance-enhancing technique or drug 
ought to be accessible to all (such is the fundamental requirement of equality, 
which is also a condition of possibility of competition), therefore, as it can-
not give any lasting advantage to any competitor, it will necessarily lead to 
searching for new advantages or new performance-enhancing drugs in an un-
ended quest for bettering performance. 
  It seems important that Sandel focuses on the economical integration of 
perfectionism rather than on the technological or machine model of self-
generation or self-manufacturing it conveys. Transhumanism aims at enhanc-
ing the performances of what Amartya Sen calls the “rational idiot”, a calcu-
lating individual only focused on his own happiness, i.e. the economic agent 
of the neo-classical theories (Sen 1993, p. 87). Such an individual is notori-
ously unsociable. To him, others are just competitors or rivals.  
  The transhumanist claim to be representative of the Enlightenment’s con-
ception of progress and perfectibility is unsubstantiated. As John Passmore 
shows, in a secular and humanist view, perfectibility concerns both individual 
and society. This is the novelty of the secular ideal of perfectibility. Whereas 
the religious view (Greek or Pelagian) confines man in his relation to God 
and hardly takes his neighbor into account, even if it enjoins us to love him as 
ourselves, the Enlightenment perfection places man in his social environ-
ment: hope of perfection lies in the man-to-man relations rather than in man-
to-God relations.  
  It seems that examining the changes nanotechnology brings to the tradi-
tional conceptions of technical objects along with the distinction between 
nature and artifact, always leads to redefine our ‘partnership’ (Bensaude-
Vincent 2004, p. 54-55) with technical individuals, whether they be human or 28 Catherine  Larrère 
 
non-human. Not only do these hybrid beings, labeled ‘cyborgs’, receive a so-
cial status, also techno-scientific practices urge us to reshape our relation-
ships with entities that cannot be objects anymore –according to the classical 
distinction between subjects and objects. The development of nanotechnol-
ogy is urging moral and political philosophy to define the social networks 
linking humans to non-humans. Yet how will we take up this challenge, if we 
limit ourselves to self-generation perfectionism, confined in the individual 
monad that has no portal and no windows, as the phrase says?  
4. Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I have taken seriously the transhumanist perfectionist 
program of human enhancement criticized by Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Mi-
chael Sandel. This programme is typical of the NBIC convergence (Roco & 
Bainbridge 2002). As long as we stick to nanotechnology (to the production 
of nanostructured materials) we only come across a problem of power. It is 
meaningful that most of the imagination related to nanotechnology, chiefly 
through Drexler’s book (Drexler 1986), is that of the grey goo, a substance 
that would consume and take the place of all that exists. Such fears clearly 
come under the new moral status of technology as Hans Jonas defined it 
(Jonas 1997). Traditionally, technology was considered morally neutral, and 
only its finality or use was a matter of moral evaluation (the Biblical distinc-
tion between the plow and the sword). Now technology is a direct object of 
ethical reflection. The scope of involuntary (and unpredictable) conse-
quences of our technological interventions, along with the self-driving tech-
nological development prevent us from sticking to the traditional distinctions 
between good and evil purposes, and force us to take into account technol-
ogy itself. Civil nuclear energy industry, according to Jonas, is as much a 
moral problem as military nuclear industry, maybe even more, because it is 
more difficult to pull out of civil nuclear energy industry than to cut down or 
even to give up on the atomic weapon arsenal.  
  While bio- and nanotechnology converge in a perfectionist credo, based 
on the philosophical ground of cognitivism, those who advocate this pro-
gram, particularly the transhumanists, do not care for the objections raised 
by the champions of human dignity. Their perfectionism relies on a strong 
ethical principle of modernity, that of ‘psychological hedonism’ according to 
which virtue is the enlightened pursuit of happiness. Such a principle has its 
due place in modern moral pluralism. But it can be questioned from the point 
of view of its social consequences and of the social bonds it enhances. Arne 
Naess (1989, p. 95) has raised some questions to assess a new technology,   Ethics and Nanotechnology: The Issue of Perfectionism  29 
such as “does it strengthen cooperation and harmonious togetherness with 
other workers” or users? Human enhancement nanotechnologies are so self-
centered, so related to individual performances, that we can strongly doubt 
that they could respond positively to Naess’questions. One way to assess 
technologies is to investigate the world associated to such technologies. 
Would we like to live in a world peopled with ‘rational idiots’, a world of ego-
istic competition? As far as I am concerned, I will answer negatively.  
Notes
 
1  The first kind of evaluation is called consequentialist. By calling the possible in-
fringement of rights and liberties ‘moral risks’, some analysts also classify the sec-
ond kind of evaluation as consequentialism. In this questioning about justice, we 
are dealing with the infringement of fundamental or intrinsic values. That is why 
we would rather consider it deontological and leave the term consequentialist to 
the first evaluation – with all possible reservations concerning the use of this term: 
an evaluation of consequences is not necessarily moral, it has to maximize a moral 
good.  
2  See the introduction of Maestrutti 2007. 
3  This point is further developed in another book by Passmore, published in 1974. 
See also Bourg 2000. 
4  Michael Sandel thus writes, about the champions of human enhancement: “The 
deeper danger is that they represent a kind of hyper-agency, a Promethean aspira-
tion to remake nature, including human nature, to serve our purposes, and satisfy 
our desires.” (Sandel 2007, p. 26-27) 
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